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ETHICS-A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL CONDEMNATION OF ATTOR­
NEy-CLIENT LIFE STORY FEE AGREEMENTS-Maxwell v. Superior 
Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Heated discussions among attorneys concerning the ethical im­
plications of fee contracts which give attorneys exclusive rights· to a 
criminal client's life story are probably rare. The average attorney 
cannot afford to spend a great deal of time worrying about the ethi­
cal dilemmas surrounding a situation with which he never expects to 
be confronted. It is not, however, just the celebrated attorneys with 
an eye toward writing books who should ponder the effects of this 
extraordinary type of fee agreement. As the use of these contracts­
whereby the client totally surrenders all rights to the story of the 
crime and his trial-becomes more commonplace, the need for a 
critical and ethical evaluation of this practice by the legal commu­
nity also increases. 
The recent case of Maxwell v. Superior Court,2 decided by the 
Supreme Court of California, serves as a good backdrop for explor­
ing the various concerns over these contracts. Maxwell is significant 
for two reasons. First, the case highlights the variety of tensions 
which life story contracts can inflict upon the attorney-client rela­
tionship. All of these tensions are manifestations of the basic under­
lying con1lict of interest inherent in these contracts. The attorney's 
pecuniary self-interest in the publicity value of the trial is at odds 
with his ethical obligations3 to plan his strategy and conduct his rep­
resentation with independent, professional judgment, undivided loy­
alty, and in the best interests of the client. 
The second significant facet of Maxwell is that the particular 
1. The contractual "rights" referred to include all variations of literary and dra­
matic rights; i.e., reenactment of a crime by movie, book, article, radio or television pres­
entation, or live entertainment. 
2. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982). 
3. See infrQ notes 163-89 and accompanying text. 
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facts of this case ideally illustrate the far-reaching effects which such 
contracts have even outside of the attorney-client relationship. A 
more complex combination of issues resulted in Maxwell because it 
involved a judge's pre-trial order disqualifying defense counsel on 
the basis of a conflict of interest related to counsel's fee contract, 
rather than the more common situation of a claim of conflict of in­
terest arising at the stage of a post-conviction appeal. The pre-trial 
status of events in Maxwell made consideration of two surfacing is­
sues crucial: the role of the judiciary and a defendant's constitu­
tional right to counsel of his choice.4 
This case note stands in clear opposition to the Maxwell deci­
sion. The court, in declaring this type of contract to be a permissible 
means of retaining an attorney,S has knowingly encouraged unethi­
cal behavior by attomeys.6 Not only is this a step backward from the 
goal of strengthening the public's confidence in lawyers and the judi­
cial process,' it is also a denial of an attorney's fiduciary obligations 
to his client. 8 The damaging effects of these contracts far outweigh 
the importance of a defendant's ability to retain counsel of his 
choice. 
Unfortunately, there is a very slim body of precedent regarding 
4. Although the breadth of the sixth amendment right to counsel is an issue crucial 
to the Maxwell decision, this casenote will not attempt an in-depth, separate analysis of 
that constitutional right-nor the related issue of waiver. The note will deal with these 
rights only to the extent necessary for comprehension of their effect upon the situation in 
Maxwell. Instead, the analysis of Maxwell and relevant case law bas been limited to a 
discussion of the interplay between the conflicting interests, ethical standards, and policy 
considerations surrounding these contracts. For extensive discussions of the impact of 
life story fee agreements upon the concepts of right to counsel and waiver, see Comment, 
Conflicting Interests in Lawyer-Client Publication Rights Agreements-TIre Story ofBobby 
Joe Maxwell, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 869 (1981); and Uelman, Conflicts and Criminal Mal­
practice, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 504 (1979). 
5. 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 196. 
6. See id at 636,639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (Richardson J., dissenting). 
The court's stamp of approval given to attorney-client life story fee agreements is even 
more disconcerting when the possibility of their widespread use in California is consid­
ered. Since it is the country's base for entertainment and media industries, that state 
offers the greatest exploitation opportunities. 
7. ''The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of jus­
tice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount. . . . [The client's recognizably impor­
tant right to counsel of his choice) must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which 
run to the very integrity of the judicial process." Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 
572 (2d Cir. 1975); see, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 268, 561 P.2d 1164, 
1173, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 485 (1977) (quoting People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 185,524 
P.2d 363, 367, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239 (1974». 
8. See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 89-189 (1953); Kindregan, Conflict ofIn­
terest and the Lawyer in Civil Practice, \0 VAL. U.L. REV. 423, 426 (1976) (discussions of 
duties owed to a client based on the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship). 
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the issue of judicial enforceability of these contracts. The courts are 
currently struggling in attempts to balance the clashing interests. 
There can be no compromise struck-the contract must either be ju­
dicially recognized or invalidated. So far, the courts have uniformly 
looked to ethical codes for guidance.9 Some have been reluctant, as 
was the Maxwell court, to rely on a code of ethics as the sole crite­
rion for its decision. lo But other courts have refused to tum their 
backs on flagrant breaches of professional ethics and have shown 
their willingness to support the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility's explicit prohibition II of these contracts by judicially 
declaring them invalid. 12 
II. ANALYSIS OF MAXWELL 
The procedural facts of Maxwell are as follows. Bobby Joe 
Maxwell, allegedly the "Skid Row Stabber,"I) was arrested on April 
4, 1979 and charged with four counts of robbery and ten counts of 
murder}4 Because several of the counts involved "special circum­
stances," he faced a possible death sentence. IS At his arraignment, 
Maxwell pleaded not gUilty and reserved the right to plead not guilty 
by reason of insanity. 16 Although Maxwell was found indigent and 
could have had court-appointed counsel, Maxwell instead retained 
private counsel by means of a life story fee contract. 17 As payment 
for representation, Maxwell irrevocably assigned to counsel all right, 
title and interest to the. story of his entire life and the pending crimi­
nal prosecution, including exclusive entertainment and commercial 
exploitation rights}S 
9. See Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 140, 158 (1981). 
10. See infra note 52 and text accompanying notes 53-78. 
II. See infra text accompanying note 167. 
12. See supra note 51 and text accompanying notes 101-14. 
13. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 1980, at 7, col. 2. Maxwell was charged with the deaths of 
ten skid row derelicts in Los Angeles between October 1978 and January 1979. Id 
14. 30 Cal. 3d at 610, 639 P.2d at 249, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
IS. Id 
16. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
17. Id at 609-12,639 P.2d at 249-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178-80. 
18. Id at 610, 639 P.2d at 250,180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The critical provisions of this 
nineteen-page retainer agreement must be known in order to fully appreciate the ethical 
dilemma created. Under the contract, Maxwell stood to receive 15% of the net proceeds 
realized by any exploitation; the remaining 85% would go to his lawyers as their fee. Id 
In return, Maxwell waived aU defamation and invasion of privacy claims which might 
arise against counsel. Id As an extra precaution, the attorneys got Maxwell to agree to 
waive his auorney-client privilege. Id n.1. It was contended by Maxwell's lawyers that 
aU possible prejudice and conflicts of interest arising from the contract were cured by a 
combination of the above-named waivers and the extensive disclosure made to Maxwell 
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On April 26, 1979, defense counsel notified the trial court of the 
existence of this fee arrangement.l 9 The judge then reviewed the 
nineteen-page agreement and questioned Maxwell as to its contents 
in order to ascertain his understanding of the conflicts of interest 
present.20 After finding that Maxwell did indeed knowingly and 
willingly agree to the contract, and although counsel's competency 
was not an issue, the trial judge nonetheless found the conflict intol­
erable and ordered the pre-trial disqualification of Maxwell's coun­
se1.21 When substitute cQunsel was appointed over Maxwell's 
protest, a mandate proceeding was brought in the court of appeals22 
to review the superior court's recusal order.23 In denying a writ of 
mandate, that court expressed wholehearted approval of the disqual­
in paragraph 14 of the contract. In essence, paragraph 14 "declares that counsel may 
wish to (I) create damaging publicity to enhance exploitation value, (2) avoid mental 
defenses because, if successful, they might suggest [Maxwell's) incapacity to make the 
contract, and (3) see him convicted and even sentenced to death for publicity value." Id 
at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. Counsel attempted to de-emphasize these 
bold admissions by closing the paragraph with a contradictory provision assuring Max­
well that they would "raise every defense . . . warranted" and would act as "diligent, 
conscientious advocate[s)." Id (emphasis added). It is also important to note, especially 
in light of Maxwell's waiver of the attorney-client privilege, that counsel was not obli­
gated, under this contract, to undertake an appeal or represent him at any stage subse­
quent to the initial trial. Id at 6\0, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
19. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
20. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. The judge's inspection of 
the contract and his questioning of Maxwell was appropriate because a judge has a strict 
duty to ensure that every defendant truly comprehends the significance and effect of 
waiving his constitutional right to conflict-free representation. Id at 620-21, 639 P.2d at 
256-57, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86. Though Maxwell possessed only an eighth-grade edu­
cation, he was literate and insisted that he was capable of a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of those conflicts. Id at 611-12, 639 P.2d at 250-51,180 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80. A 
different trial judge inquired into this contract, sua sponte, and again tested Maxwell's 
comprehension on September 14, 1979. Id Maxwell reiterated his waiver as well as his 
satisfaction with his present counsel. Id 
21. Id at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. In ruling that the retainer 
agreement created such a conflict of interest that Maxwell would be deprived of effective 
assistance of counsel, the trial judge relied upon People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 
145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978). In Corona, a murder conviction was reversed because post­
trial examination of a similar literary rights contract showed a conflict of interest which 
resulted in ineffective representation. Id at 727, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 920. The basic conflict 
of interest referred to is the same in all cases involving royalty contracts: the attorney's 
pecuniary interest in a lengthy, sensational trial will necessarily taint his judgment as to 
what trial tactics are in his client's best interests. See, e.g., id at 719-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 
915; Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 627-31, 639 P.2d at 261-63, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190-93 (Rich­
ardson, J., dissenting). 
22. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980), 
vacated, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982). 
23. A recusal order is one which disqualifies an attorney on the basis of interest or 
prejudice. 
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mcation.24 Stressing that counsel had violated ethical standards in 
creating the contract,2S and that maintaining the integrity of the judi­
cial process was a concern paramount to a defendant's right to coun­
sel of choice,26 the court of appeals urged judicial disapprovaP7 of 
these "unconscionable and outrageous"28 contracts. 
The Supreme Court of California disagreed and issued a writ 
mandating that the trial judge's recusal order be overturned and that 
Maxwell's original counsel be reinstated.29 It was held that when 
only a mere possibility of prejudice is created by a conflict of interest 
and a defendant knowingly waives all consequences of the potential 
conft.icts, pre-trial removal of counsel is not warranted.30 The court's 
insistence upon the need for actual prejudice and its deference to 
Maxwell's waiver reveal the great significance which that court at­
tached to a defendant's right to demand particular counsel, even po­
tentially "deficient"3) counse1.32 The court did not ignore, however, 
the contrasting view "that life-story fee contracts are inherently prej­
udicial, unethical, and against public policy ...."33 The very fact 
24. Maxwell v Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849, 861 
(1980). 
25. Id at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 853-55. 
26. Id at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 855-61. See supra text accompanying note 163 for 
the wording of the relevant ethical standard applicable in Maxwell. 
27. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856 
(1980). "A conflict of interest which arises from the fee-interest potential of the retainer 
agreement here is so inherently conducive to divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of 
the right to effective representation as a mailer of law." Id (emphasis added). 
28. Id at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 861. 
29. 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. 
30. Id at 610, 639 P.2d at 249, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178. As support for this holding, 
the majority relied on Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
I (1968), and Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 Cal. 2d 832, 447 P.2d 650, 73 Cal. Rptr. 410 
(1968). 
31. 30 Cal. 3d at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. 
32. "[T)he involuntary removal of an attorney is a severe limitation on a defend­
ant's right to counsel and may be justified, if at aU, only in the most flagrant circum­
stances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial controls have 
failed." Id at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (quoting Cannon v. Commis­
sion on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678,697,537 P.2d 898, 911, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 
791 (1975». 
33. Id at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182. The court examined a 
number of decisions, including the following, in which this opposing view was found 
persuasive and prevailed. Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.), cerro 
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); Ray V. Rose, 535 F.2d 966, 974 (6th Cir.), cerro denied,429 
U.S. 1026 (1976); United States V. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1978), 
vacated, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); People v. Co­
rona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915 (1978). Ultimately, the Maxwell 
court rejected the argument that preservation of "the integrity of a trial and thus, confi­
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that the court did consider the many ethicaP4 and public policy3S 
concerns involved, and yet was not convinced of their overriding im­
portance, makes its cautious closing remark36 all the more contradic­
tory to its holding.31 
Chief Justice Bird, concurring and dissenting, defended these 
contracts on the additional ground that they might be the only 
means by which an indigent defendant could ever secure counsel of 
his choice.38 He dissented from Maxwell's result, however, conclud­
dence in the judicial process" were concerns that "outweigh a single defendant's interest 
in chosen counsel." 30 Cal. 3d at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182. 
34. 30 Cal. 3d at 616-17 nn.5-6, 639 P.2d at 253-54 nn.5-6, ISO Cal. Rptr. at 183 
nn.5-6; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-4 & DR 5-103(A) 
(1979); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(d) (Discussion Draft 1980) 
(current version of MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(d) (1983»; CAL­
IFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-101 (1975). For further discussion 
of these rules, see supra notes 163-89 and accompanying text. 
35. A major public policy concern which was quickly dismissed by the majority is 
the existence in many states of so-called "Son of Sam" statutes. These laws provide "that 
any proceeds from commercial exploitation of one's crimes shall be paid into state-super­
vised escrow funds for disbursement to victims and for legal defense. . . . A similar 
proposal failed in the California Legislature." 30 Cal. 3d at 617 n.7, 639 P.2d at 254 n.7, 
180 Cal. Rptr. at 183 n.7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1978); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-14-31 (1982); Criminal Victim's Escrow Account Act of 1979, §§ 1-10, ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 401-410 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 258A, § 8 (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982). Such 
statutes reveal the public's disdain for contracts involving exploitation rights to reenact a 
crime, regardless of who the other contracting party is. But since these statutes require 
only those proceeds which would otherwise go to the criminal under the contract to be 
paid into the account, Maxwell's lawyer could retain his profits even if California had 
chosen to adopt such legislation. Nonetheless, such statutes single these contracts out as 
being against public policy because they allow the offender to monetarily profit from his 
crime while his victims go uncompensated. It seems similarly inequitable to allow an 
attorney to become unjustly enriched as a direct consequence of an atrociously violent 
crime. 
36. "We stress that our opinion connotes no moral or ethical approval of life-story 
fee contracts." 30 Cal. 3d at 622,639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. 
37. The dissent was disturbed at the majority's attempt to deny its ethical and 
moral approval of such cOntracts while at the same time allowing their existence regard­
less of numerous unethical implications. "With due respect, it seems to me inescapable 
that the majority does approve and sanction the agreement." Id at 636, 639 P.2d at 266, 
180 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (Richardson, l., dissenting) (emphasis in original). lustice Kaus, 
although concurring, was also disappointed and "had hoped that our opinion would find 
harsher language respecting the 'life story' contract's propriety as well as its enforceabil­
ity." Id at 622-23, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Kaus, l., concurring). 
38. Id at 623-24, 639 P.2d at 258-59, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Bird, C.l., concurring 
and dissenting). This is indeed quite an elevation of the right to choose one's counsel. 
Indigent criminal defendants are already guaranteed free court-appointed counsel. Ar­
guably, such protection for indigents satisfies the constitutional guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel if all lawyers are to be presumed competent. To say that an indi­
gent defendant has a constitutional right to secure a more famous attorney not only 
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ing that no adequate waiver was made by Maxwell.39 
Justice Richardson, however, wholly dissented. Focusing upon 
the particular provisions of Maxwell's contract, its troubling fea­
tures, and the numerous contlicts of interest created by it, he found 
the contlicts to be irreconcilable.40 After exploring all pertinent ethi­
cal guidelines41 in greater detail than did the majority, Justice Rich­
ardson found these collective judgments extremely persuasive.42 In 
addition to the erosion of judicial integrity,43 he deplored two other 
results of these contracts: the breach of an attorney's fiduciary obli­
gations to his client,44 and the delay in the trial on the merits.4S In 
response to the majority's jealous protection of a defendant's right to 
choose his counsel, Justice Richardson pointed out that because 
Maxwell faced the possibility of a death sentence, he especially re­
quired "counsel whose allegiance to him is total and unalloyed, free 
of the subtle, opposing magnetic pull of self-interest or adverse pecu­
niary advantage. This, the majority refuses to assure."46 
III. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
Case law in this area is limited because the use of a life story 
contract by an attorney as a fee arrangement is an extraordinary and 
makes the right to counsel of choice an absolute one, but also suggests that court-ap­
pointed counsel would provide ineffective representation. 
39. Id at 624-25, 639 P.2d at 259-60, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89 (Bird, c.J., concur­
ring and dissenting). Chief Justice Bird asserted that the inadequacy flowed from several 
facts: no layman could possibly understand the magnitude and ramifications of the con­
flict; Maxwell was not specifically informed of his inability to raise consequences of the 
waived conflicts of interest on appeal; and the impact of waiving the attorney-client privi­
lege was not explained to Maxwell. Chief Justice Bird would have ordered an additional 
hearing to advise Maxwell of this information and then see if he still preferred to make 
the waivers. Id 
40. Id at 626, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
41. Id at 631-~3, 639 P.2d at 263-64, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94. 
42. Id at 633, 639 P.2d at 264, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194. 
43. Id at 631-32, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
44. Id at 632, 639 P.2d at 264, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
45. Id at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190. 
46. Id at 627, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190. This important point went 
unaddressed by the majority. It is likely that most defendants who sell their life story 
rights to attorneys are persons who have been charged with committing a crime so vio­
lent as to bring them national notoriety. Therefore, the client-party to these contracts 
will almost invariably face a harsh sentence if convicted. Protection of his constitutional 
rights is crucial in such a situation and therefore a conflict of interest involving the law­
yer's financial interests should not be tolerated. By analogy, it is for this very reason that 
contingent fees are disallowed in criminal cases. 
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fairly recent phenomenon.47 The result is that clearly defined legal 
guidelines concerning such use have yet to be developed. Patterns, 
however, have emerged from the various cases and courts. 
Most courts analyze the contlict of interest created by these con­
tracts in terms of the same test applied to confticts stemming from 
multiple representation:48 some proof of actual prejudice is re­
quired.49 The other pattern which has emerged is that nearly all of 
the courts considered defense counsel's violation of or compliance 
with ABA and other ethical standards as a factor. so Occasionally, 
these ethical standards were regarded as outcome-determinative, S1 
but often were deemed only pertinent and not controlling of the con­
flict of interest issue.s2 Notwithstanding these two patterns, the cases 
reveal a definite lack of uniformity with regard to application of law, 
analysis, and result. 
A. Federal Cases 
Most of the federal case law on the issue of conflicts of interest 
stemming from attorney-client life story agreements developed out 
of factual settings significantly different from that in Maxwell. Un­
like the pre-trial situation ofMaxwell, the contlict of interest issue in 
these cases was not presented until the stage of a post-conviction ap­
peal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.S) Nonetheless, they 
are important cases since the basic contlict involved is the same, and 
the Maxwell court looked to these cases for guidance. 
47. See Annot., supra note 9, for an overview of federal cases involving such roy­
alty agreements. 
48. See United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1978), oJrd, 
638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981) (dicta that any difference 
between a conflict of interest based on multiple representation and one based on an attor­
ney's private financial interests is immaterial). 
49. See, e.g., id; Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); Fullerv. Israel, 421 F. Supp. 582, 584 (E.D. Ill. 1976); Ray v. 
Rose, 392 F. Supp. 601, 620 (W.O. Tenn. 1975), oJrd, 535 F.2d 966 (6th Cir.), cert. de­
nied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976). 
50. Annot., supra note 9, at 158. See generally Note, Conjfict o/Interests When 
Allorneys AcqUire Rights to the Client's Lift Story, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 299, 306 (1981). 
51. Annot., supra note 9, at 158; see, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); Castillo v. Estelle, 
504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 
(1978). 
52. Annot., supra note 9, at 158; see cases cited supra note 49. 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 144-56 for a discussion of the significance of 
this difference. 
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Ray v. Rose 54 was an early case involving a lawyer's acquisition 
of exploitation rights. The defendant, James Earl Ray, was con­
victed of first-degree murder for the slaying of civil rights leader, 
Martin Luther King, Jr.55 Ray had entered into a pre-trial contract 
with his attorney which made the attorney Ray's exclusive agent for 
purposes of publishing and filming his life story. 56 Further contracts 
were then made with an established author for the publication of 
both magazine articles and a book, with most proceeds to go to the 
author and the attorney. 57 Ray was advised to plead guilty and did 
so, but on appeal claimed that such plea was made involuntarily. 58 
Ray's contention was that his attorney's conflicting financial interest 
in the publication proceeds caused him to improperly advise Ray to 
plead guilty.59 
The Ray court applied a test enunciated in Beasley v. United 
States60 to Ray's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.61 That 
test first requires that counsel perform as well as any lawyer "with 
ordinary training and skill in the criminallaw."62 In denying Ray's 
petition for relief, the court held that Ray had failed to establish that 
his attorney's performance was not at least of this caliber.63 It also 
considered the strong possibility that the death penalty would have 
been imposed had the case gone to trial. 64 The second half of the 
test is that the lawyer "must conscientiously protect his client's inter­
est, undefiected by confiicting considerations. "65 Interpreting this to 
imply that confiicting .considerations must additionally be found to 
result in actual prejudice, the Ray court found only potential con­
54. 392 F. SUppa 601 (W.o. Tenn. 1975). affd. 535 F.2d 966 (6th Cu.). cerl. denied, 
429 U.S. 1026 (1976). 
55. Id at 603-04. 
56. Id at 604. 
57. Id at 604-05. Under the original contract, both Ray and his attorney were 
each to receive 30% of the proceeds. In a second contract. Ray further agreed to give 40% 
of his share to his attorney as additional payment of fees. This second contract was later 
amended to requue instead a payment of $20.000 plus expenses. Id 
58. Id at 603. 
59. Id at 607. 618-20. The basis of this contention was that his attorney desired to 
rush a guilty plea, thereby avoiding a lengthy trial, in order to meet a publication dead­
line. Id 
60. 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cu. 1974). The Beasley coun cited Glasser v. U.S., 315 
U.S. 60 (1942), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). as authority for this 
test. 491 F.2d at 696. 
61. 392 F. Supp. at 617-18. 
62. Id at 618. 
63. Id 
64. Id at 619. 
65. Id at 618. 
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flicts of interest arising from the contract.66 
The Roy court also considered the contract in light of the ABA 
Code of Professional Responsibility and conceded that Disciplinary 
Rule 5-104(B)67 had been violated.68 This factor alone, however, was 
deemed insufficient to warrant a reversal.69 Taking a "totality of the 
circumstances" approach,70 the court even suggested that disclosure 
within the contract of the attorney's adverse financial interests con­
stituted a waiver by Ray of any conflicts.7! Significantly, the court 
also mentioned its reluctance to intrude upon the privacy of the at­
torney-client relationship.72 
The very same issue was brought to another federal court not 
long after Roy was decided. The facts of Fuller v. Israef13 are quite 
similar to those ofRoy and, indeed, the analysis and result run par­
allel. In Fuller, a defendant convicted of murder sought habeus 
corpus relief alleging that counsel's financial interest in the defend­
ant's unpublished writings and video tapes (relating to the murder 
offense) created a conflict of interest which rendered his representa­
tion ineffective.74 In particular, the defendant claimed that his attor­
ney encouraged a guilty plea in order to keep the unpublished 
documents from becoming public records at atrial.7S This court, 
similar to Roy, held that although the contract giving the attorney 
such financial interests had violated Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B), 
such violation did not, in itself, justify a per se rule mandating rever­
saP6 Rather, some actual prejudice must be shown, and "the exist­
ence of the contract alone is insufficient to prove ineffective 
assistance of counsel."77 Applying a test similar to the one enunci­
ated in Beasley and Roy, the Fuller court also found counsel's per­
formance to be within the acceptable range of competence.78 
In Wojtowicz v. United States,79 the defendant and his confeder­
66. Id at 620. 
67. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(8) (1981). For the 
text of DR 5-I04(B). see infra text accompanying note 167. 
68. 392 F. Supp. at 620. 
69. Id 
70. Id at 621. 
71. Id at 619-20. 
72. Id at 621. 
73. 421 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Ill. 1976). 
74. Id at 583. 
75. Id 
76. Id at 584-85. 
77. Id 
78. Id at 585·86. 
79. 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.). cerl. denied. 431 U.S. 972 (1977). 
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ates had held hostages in a New York bank after committing an 
armed robbery.80 The police laid seige to the bank but then agreed 
to transport the robbers to the airport where they were finally ar­
rested.81 Wojtowicz was later convicted of armed robbery.82 Woj­
towicz's attorney was to be paid his fee and expenses from a fund 
created by the sale of movie rights to the crime.83 Counsel had par­
ticipated in negotiating such sale.84 In accord with both Ray and 
Fuller, the Wojtowicz court denied the defendant's post-conviction 
plea for relief.8s In response to Wojtowicz's claim that counsel's 
financial interest in the movie caused him to urge a guilty plea, the 
court said, "[w]bile we do not regard the practice [of attorneys ac­
quiring literary or dramatic rights] as worthy of emulation, we can­
not say that it rendered counsel's representation constitutionally 
defective."86 
Another federal decision on point dealt with a crime that was 
even more publicized than Dr. King's assassination: the Patty 
Hearst case. In United States v. Hearst,87 the defendant appealed 
her conviction for armed robbery, alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel. She contended that her attorney, F. Lee Bailey, motivated 
by his own interests in a contract to write a book concerning the trial, 
put her on the stand in order to remove vast areas of her story from 
the veil of the attorney-client privilege.88 Hearst also alleged that 
Bailey's advising her to take the stand was designed to draw further 
attention to the trial.89 This trial strategy was claimed to be a mani­
festation of the contlict between Bailey's personal goals and the in­
terests of his client. 90 
On appeal, the court denied Hearst's motion for an order vacat­
ing her sentence.91 Admitting that Bailey's financial interests ren­
80. Id at 787. The facts of this case have been made famous via the popular 
movie "Dog Day Afternoon." Id 
81. Id 
82. Id 




87. 466 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1978), "oeo/ed, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), eeTl. 
denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981). 
88. Id at 1083. In Moxwell, counsel attempted to avoid this potential problem by 
having Maxwell waive the attorney-C:lient privilege before the trial. See supra note 18. 
This provision was stricken from the agreement following counsel's reinstatement. 
89. 466 F. Supp. at 1083. 
90. Id at 1082-83. 
91. Id at 1088. 
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dered his performance suspect, and even conceding that acquiring 
literary rights was a practice deserving ofjudicial condemnation, the 
court nonetheless followed the federal precedent ofRay, Fuller, and 
Wojtowicz, and required a showing of actual prejudice to render the 
representation constitutionally deficient.92 The court discerned no 
such prejudice from the record and viewed the putting of Hearst on 
the stand as a reasonable tactic.93 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit va­
cated the district court opinion and remanded, holding that such a 
denial of relief without a hearing was an error.94 The court further 
ordered that the United States Supreme Court decision of Cuyler v. 
Sullivan ,95 decided after the district court's denial, be applied on re­
mand.96 Although Cuyler involved a conflict of interest arising from 
multiple representation, the Hearst court held that any difference 
was immateria1.97 The holding in Cuyler had required a convict 
seeking a writ of habeus corpus to show an actual rather than merely 
a potential conflict of interest.98 This requirement, however, is not 
the same as a showing of prejudice.99 For example, in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, it would be almost impossible to 
show prejudice if the end result, a conviction, would most likely 
have been the same without the conflict. Instead, all that Cuyler re­
quires, according to the court of appeals in Hearst, is a showing that 
the alleged potential conflict did ripen into an actual conflict as evi­
denced by some adverse effect on the attorney's performance. loo 
In drawing such a distinction between "condict" and 
"prejudice,"lol the Hearst court was the first to deviate from the pat­
tern of analysis which had emerged from Ray, Fuller, and Wojtow­
92. Id at 1083. 
93. Id 
94. 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981). 
95. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
96. 638 F.2d at 1193. 
97. Id 
98. 446 U.S. an50. 
99. 638 F.2d at 1194. 
100. Id Under such a test, an actual conflict could be established by proving that 
the attorney's advice to plead guilty or to take the stand, or his withdrawal of a crucial 
defense was motivated by his own financial interests rather than by what course of action 
would be in the client's best interests. It would be unnecessary to prove that the attor­
ney's action prejudiced the outcome of the case. See id. 
101. This same distinction was drawn much earlier in Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that the test of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether the 
representation would have been more effective had it not been for the conflict of interest). 
See also United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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iCZ. 102 Also, the court ofappeals in Hearst was far more outraged by 
the contract involved than were those previous courts. The Ninth 
Circuit not only criticized Bailey's conduct as being violative of ethi­
cal rules and unbecoming a member of the bar,103 but also en­
couraged the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Bailey. 104 
B. California Precedent 
In addition to the federal cases, the Maxwell court examined its 
own state law. A decision directly on point, and decided not long 
before Maxwell, is People v. Corona. los Juan Corona was convicted 
of twenty-five counts of first-degree murder for the killing of twenty­
five migratory farmworkers. I06 The murders, all occurring between 
February and May of 1971 and under bizarre circumstances, were 
naturally the focus of national media attention. 107 Corona retained 
a private, solo practitioner and contracted for his services by surren­
dering exclusive literary and dramatic rights to his life story. lOS 
Under this contract, Corona waived the attorney-client privilege and 
was not entitled to any income derived from his attorney's exercise 
of the relinquished rights. 109 The attorney hired a writer to sit at the 
defense table throughout the trial, and a book was published just a 
few months after completion of the trial. 110 
102. Prior to Hearst, the federal courts occasionaIly departed from the requirement 
of actual prejudice, but usua1ly only in situations where the conflict of interest was 
ftagrant. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978); Castillo v. Estelle, 
504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974). InAllIQTez, the defendant's attorney had also represented 
co-indictees who pleaded guilty and testified against the defendant. 580 F.2d at 1253-54. 
In reversing the conviction, the court ruled that such conflict-laden representation was 
invidious and not susceptible to fine gradations. It!. at 1256-57. Therefore, once an 
actual conflict of interest is established, no showing of prejudice is necessary because the 
representation is tantamount to a denial of counsel itself. It!. In CastUlo, the defendant's 
attorney represented not only the defendant in a theft trial, but reprcscnted the theft 
victim as well in a civil suit. 504 F.2d at 1244-45. It was held that such conflicting 
loyalties were sufficient for a reversal without specific prejudice. It!. at 1245. 
103. 638 f.2d at 1198. "Potential and actual conflicts of interest always bring dis­
repute upon the bar, the court, and the law. They do so to an even greater degree when 
the case is a cause celebre and the attorney has the reputation of being an outstanding 
lawyer." It!. 
104. It!. at 1199. 
105. 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978). 
106. It!. at 693, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98. 
107. It!. 
108. It!. at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
109. It!. at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04. This contract is very similar to Maxwell's 
except that Maxwell retained an interest in 15% of the profits. 
110. It!. at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 904; see E. CRAY, BURDEN OF PROOF, THE CASE 
OF JUAN CORONA (1978). 
864 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:851 
On a petition for habeas corpus, Corona alleged two separate 
grounds for reversal. The first was ineffective assistance of counsel 
due to counsel's prejudicial withdrawal of crucial defenses; the sec­
ond was that the conflict of interest created by the contract rendered 
the trial so inherently unfair as to justify a reversal per se. 111 Co­
rona's conviction was reversed and proceedings remanded, based 
upon a combination of both grounds. I 12 
The court first declared that effectiveness of counsel included 
not only professional competence but also undivided loyalty of serv­
ices, undiminished by conflicting considerations. l13 The court then 
held that the contract involved created a conflict of interest so inher­
ently conducive to divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of effec­
tive representation as a mailer of law. 114 
Although the court placed great emphasis on the question of 
divided loyalties, I 15 the manner and quality of the legal representa­
tion were also in issue. Due to the attorney's blatantly inadequate 
trial performance, the court also stressed the fact that the conflict of 
interest had resulted in actual prejudice to Corona. 116 
This latter finding has caused some courts to give sole import to 
Corona's language regarding prejudice and to then conclude that ac­
tual prejudice is still required for a reversal. 117 A comprehensive 
analysis of Corona, however, reveals that the court gave both argu­
ments equal importance and so the existence of the contract alone 
III. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 704-05, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
112. Id at 730, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 922. Corona's retrial came to a close in Septem­
ber of 1982. Corona was again convicted of first-degree murder on all twenty-five 
counts. This second trial lasted seven months and cost the taxpayers of California an 
estimated $5 million. It was the most expensive trial for a single defendant in California 
history. His first trial cost only $415,000. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at 16, col. I. In 
light of the strong case against Corona, and thus the predictable outcome of a retrial, the 
exorbitant cost of the retrial, and the waste of judicial time involved, it is hard to justify 
allowance of life story agreements. Their effects are simply too costly. 
113. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 719-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915. 
114. Id (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); and CastiUo v. Estelle, 
504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974» (emphasis added); see mpra notes 101-02 and accompany­
ing text. 
115. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 719-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915. "From that moment [of the 
contract's inception) on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting inter­
ests-he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his 
client, the accused." Id 
116. Id at 721-25,145 Cal. Rptr. at 915-19. Actual prejudice was evidenced by the 
withdrawal of crucial defenses, counsel's failure to perform adequate investigation, coun­
sel's trying the case to the press to inflame passions, and the empty, unfulfilled promises 
of counsel's opening statement. Id 
117. The Hearst court, for example. interpreted Corona in this manner. 466 F. 
Supp. at 1083. 
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would probably have been sufficient to require a reversal per se, re­
gardless of whether or not actual prejudice had resulted. 
The confusion as to the correct interpretation of Corona is best 
illustrated by the conflicting decisions reached in Maxwell. The 
court of appeals, in deciding Maxwell, chose to rely heavily on Co­
rona's language concerning divided loyalties and affirmed the dis­
qualification of Maxwell's counsel. I18 The Supreme Court of 
California, on the other hand, stressed only Corona's discussion of 
prejudice and reinstated a requirement of actual prejudice in Max­
well. 1l9 The court chose not to read Corona as holding that life story 
contracts constitute a per se denial of effective representation, 
notwithstanding abundant language in Corona that would support 
such a conclusion. 
C. Subsequent Applications of Maxwell 
In holding a defendant's right to choose his own counsel to be of 
sacred importance, even at the cost of likely harm to the client and 
the judicial process, the Maxwell court has opened the door to dan­
gerous extensions of this notion. Faced with the task of applying 
Maxwell as precedent, a California court, in People v. McKenzie, 120 
cited Maxwell for the proposition that a defendant's right to choose 
his counsel is paramount even to effectiveness of representation. 121 
Consequently, the McKenzie court held that an attorney's clearly in­
competent representation and total dereliction of duty did not consti­
tute per se reversible error, even though it was an ethical violation. 122 
The defendant in McKenzie was charged with rape, robbery and as­
sault with a deadly weapon. 123 Throughout the trial, the appointed 
public defender did nothing more to participate than to sit mute at 
the defense table. 124 This behavior was in reaction to the judge's 
pre-trial denial of his request to withdraw from representation of the 
defendant. 12s Because the defendant himself had not objected to the 
representation and because the attorney's threat to remain mute at 
trial constituted only a potential conflict of interest at the pre-trial 
stage, the court applied Maxwell's logic and held paramount the de­
118. 101 Cal. App. 3d at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 856. 
119. 30 Cal. 3d at 612-14, 639 P.2d at 251-52, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81. 
120. 130 Cal. App. 3d 73, 181 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982). 
121. Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
122. Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 504. 
123. Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 497. 
124. Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 499. 
125. Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
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fendant's right to choose his own counsel, however incompetent. 126 
Appealing his conviction, the defendant claimed ineffective assist­
ance of counsel. Though this certainly seems to be a valid claim, the 
court, in applying Maxwell, refused to reverse on this ground. 127 In­
stead, they looked to the record for actual prejudice, as suggested by 
Maxwell, and found none. 128 As to the attorney's blatantly unethi­
cal behavior, that matter was left to the hands of the State Bar. 129 
The defendant had not received anything even close to the loyal, 
competent representation required by ethical standards,130 nor did 
he receive a judicial remedyl3l for that abrogation. 
A federal court in Florida reached an opposite result, though, in 
United States v. Hobson,132 when it chose an analysis similar to the 
dissent's approach in Maxwell. The criminal defendant's attorney in 
Hobson was disqualified for allegedly violating an ethical rule.133 
The defendant was being prosecuted for drug trafficking and it was 
alleged that his attorney had prior knowledge of the marijuana 
smuggling scheme. l34 As in Maxwell, the defendant had attempted 
to waive the ethical conflict and insisted upon retaining the counsel 
of his choice. 13S The Hobson court, relying on the same strong pub­
lic policy argument offered in Maxwell's dissent,I36 held that a de­
fendant was not free to waive any ethical problems because the 
public's perception of the attorney and the legal system was in­
volved; vindication of the right to counsel of choice would create a 
serious risk of undermining the public's confidence. 137 As to the ap­
propriateness of immediate disqualification, the court added that 
proof of actual wrongdoing was not needed; the mere likelihood of 
public suspicion outweiged the interest of counsel's continued partic­
126. Id at -. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03. 
127. Id at -. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 504. 
128. Id 
129. Id 
130. Id -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 501. "Here we do not seek to hide the fact that 
defendant was actually demed by his own attorney effective assistance which could have 
been rendered. . . ." Id 
131. Id at -. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 502. "[T)he choice by defense counsel to deny his 
client effective representation was not of the court's making ...." Id Obviously, the 
court is not willing to enforce a lawyer's duties, and yet, the court is ignoring its own duty 
to ensure the fairness of all judicial proceedings. See infra note 154. 
132. 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir.), cerl. denied, 103 S. Ct. 208 (1982). 
133. Id at 826. 
134. Id 
135. Id at 829. 
136. Id at 827-28. The Hobson majority did not, however, cite to Maxwell. The 
Hobson dissent did. 
137. Id; see also H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 120. 
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ipation. 138 Judge Kravitch, dissenting in part, admonished that 
"[d]isqualification of counsel in a criminal case on the 'appearance 
of impropriety' should be a remedy sparingly used."139 He then 
cited to Maxwell as a decision which held that erosion of public con­
fidence in the judicial system could never transcend one's interest in 
counsel of choice. 140 
D. D!/ferent Posture of Maxwell 
With the exception of Hobson, the federal and state cases dis­
cussed have a significant common aspect which Maxwell does not 
have: they all considered the confiict of interest issue at the post­
conviction appellate stage of the proceedings. A case such as Max­
well, involving the unusual posture of preventive disqualification in 
anticipation of prejudice, cannot possibly be analyzed in terms of the 
"actual prejudice" standard applied in post-conviction cases, even 
though the underlying issue is indeed the same. Thus, the initial is­
sue facing the Maxwell court was the proper role of the judiciary in a 
pre-trial situation. First, does a judge have the discretion to balance 
the interests of ensuring a fair trial and the probability of prejudice 
against a defendant's right to waive confticts and retain particular 
counsel?141 Second, is it within a judge's supervisory powers to dis­
qualify an attorney for an ethical violation?142 Although the Max­
well court answered both of these questions in the negative, it was 
only able to do so after distinguishing a relevant California case, 
Comden v. Superior Court, 143 which had previously answered these 
questions in the affirmative. 
While superficially distinguishing l44 Maxwell from Comden on 
the facts, the Maxwell court hinted at its real reason for not follow­
ing Comden: it believed that Comden was becoming weak law in 
light of subsequent liberalizing of ethical standards by the State Bar 
ofCalifornia. 14s Although a civil case, the issue in Comden was simi­
lar to that in Maxwell.l 46 An attorney was disqualified because of a 
138. 672 F.2d at 828. 
139. Id at 831 (Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting). 
140. Id n.7. 
141. 30 Cal. 3d at 612-17, 639 P.2d at 251-54, 180 Cal. Rptr. 180-83. 
142. Id 
143. 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). 
144. 30 Cal. 3d at 618, 639 P.2d at 255, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184. "None of those cases 
compels or authorizes a dismissal (of the attorney) here." Id 
145. 30 Cal. 3d at 619 n.9, 639 P.2d at 255 n.9, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85 n.9. 
146. The distinguishing fact that Maxwell is a criminal case should not render 
Comden useless as precedent. Comden's emphasis on maintaining uncompromised ethi­
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potential conflict of interest: it was likely that a member of his firm 
would be called as a witness in violation of a California ethical 
rule. 147 Comden held that "[flailing voluntary withdrawal by trial 
counsel in such situation a trial court is vested with broad discretion 
to order withdrawal."148 Not only was a timely disqualification 
within the court's power, such disqualification was necessary in or­
der to both minimize the prejudice caused by delay,149 and "ensure 
that the standards of ethics remain high."ISO But the Maxwell court 
chose to ignore the explicit recognition in Comden that a judge has 
discretion to perform a pre-trial balancing of interests which may 
result in a disqualification of counsel. 
The Maxwell court would probably disapprove, then, of a simi­
lar recognition of these judicial powers in United States v. Dolan, lSI 
a federal case decided post-Maxwell. The Dolan court went beyond 
merely authorizing a judge's discretionary pre-trial balancing. De­
fendant's retained attorney was disqualified for breaching an ethical 
standard. Specifically, in representing multiple criminal defendants, 
the attorney became unable to adequately represent the separate in­
terests of each defendant once he put one defendant on the witness 
stand. 1S2 This disqualification was upheld as a valid exercise of the 
court's supervisory powers, notwithstanding the other defendant's at­
tempted waiver of the conflict of interest. IS) The Dolan court ulti­
mately held that when an attorney will be unable, in a judge's 
opinion, to conform with the ABA Code of Professional Responsi­
bility's requirement of adequately representing the interests of each 
client, the judge should not be forced to tolerate an inadequate rep­
resentation of that defendant. 1s4 Breaches of professional ethics in­
cal standards of representation is all the more applicable when the affected client is an 
indigent criminal defendant whose liberty and perhaps life are at stake. 
147. 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at II. 
148. Id at 915-16, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13. 
149. Id at 913-14,576 P.2d at 974, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 12. 
ISO. Id at 912,576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at II (quoting United States ex rei 
Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating &: Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 489 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976». 
lSI. 570F.2d 1177 (3rdCir. 1978). 
152. Id at 1178-79. 
153. Id at 1182, 1184. 
154. Id at 1184. Pre-trial disqualification of an attorney who has breached an 
ethical obligation to his client seems to be wholly justified by Canon 1 of the ABA Code 
of Judicial Conduct which states: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispen­
sable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, 
and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integ­
rity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon I (1972). In fact, every judge has a duty to "take or initiate appropriate 
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vite disrespect for the integrity of the court. ISS Thus, Dolan can be 
interpreted to call for a per se judicial rule of disqualification when­
ever an attorney has clearly violated an ethical standard,ls6 without 
the formality of a case-by-case balancing of interests. 
IV. PROPOSAL: A JUDICIALLy-ENFORCED PER"SE RULE 
The proposal offered in this casenote is not as wide in scope as 
those suggested by Dolan and other authorities which encourage ju­
dicial enforcement of all ethical standards. This certainly would be 
a heavy burden to place upon an already clogged judicial system. 
Because this article is limited to an analysis of the conflicts of interest 
inherent in life story agreements, the proposal offered is similarly 
narrow: a per se rule of invalidating such contracts is justifiable and 
should be applied by the courts on a uniform basis. Several reasons 
supply the justification for strict judicial enforcement of such a rule. 
These types of contracts can only vary in degrees as to their 
unconscionability and inherent conflicts of interest. Every single 
contract of this type creates at least potential conflicts that immedi­
ately do harm to the public's image of the bar and the judiciary. 
Thus, there is no need to impede judicial efficiency by compelling 
the judge to inquire into the particular provisions of these contracts. 
A case-by-case balancing of interests is unnecessary when the same 
interests will conflict in every situation. Neither is it feasible to be­
lieve that a judge is able to predict accurately, in the pre-trial stage, 
the likelihood of a potential conflict ripening into actual harm to the 
defendant. IS? 
Further, this inability to predict accurately the probability of 
such ripening does not justify a ''wait and see" approach. As 
demonstrated in the case law discussed, when the conflict of interest 
issue is not raised until a post-conviction appeal, the defendant then 
has the burden of showing actual prejudice. This is extremely hard 
to prove. First, a judge is naturally reluctant to give relief to an al­
ready convicted criminal unless there is concrete proof of prejudice 
disciplinary measures against a . . . lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the 
judge may become aware." Id Canon 3(b)(3). 
ISS. 570 F.ld at 1184. 
156. See Geer, RepresentaJion ofMultiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts ofInterest 
and the ProfeSSional ResponsiJJUitin ofthe Defense Allomey, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119, ISO­
51 (1977-1978) (similar advocation of disqualification of an attorney before a potential 
conflict culminates in a clear impairment of his independent, professional judgment). 
157. 30 Cal. 3d at 630, 639 P.2d at 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., 
dissenting). 
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from an actual conflict. Second, actual harm caused by divided loy­
alties or reduced zeal is difficult to detect from a record, and so it is 
more likely that a court will label most of the attorney's decisions as 
"reasonable tactics." Also, if the state's evidence is overwhelming, 
and thus the outcome of a retrial with different counsel would most 
likely be another conviction, the judge might not grant a reversal 
even if he discerns actual harm caused by the contract's existence. 
Therefore, it would be an injustice to "play the odds" and conduct 
the trial in the hopes that the conflicts will not actually prejudice the 
client. Not only does the client stand to suffer irreparable harm from 
such a gamble, but his right to effective assistance of counsel will 
have been violated at the outset by the initial allowance of the con­
flict-ridden representation. 
Neither is it an appropriate argument that a lawyer should be 
given the benefit of the doubt and that the public should faithfully 
trust in his ability to maintain independent judgment and undivided 
loyalty, even in the face of temptations to act in his own financial 
interests. IS8 Lawyers are no less human than anyone else, and, 
therefore, no less vulnerable to subtle temptation. As pointed out in 
the Maxwell dissent, an opportunity for pecuniary advantage can 
cause even an unconscious swaying of the lawyer's decisions.ls9 
Therefore, the per se rule would not be a pessimistic or an over­
inclusive one. Rather, the rule is a prophylactic one which seeks to 
avoid prejudice to a client in a situation where such harm is ex­
tremely likely to occur, even if the lawyer involved has honest inten­
tions. l60 It is the nature of the contract itself which mandates a per 
se rule prohibiting them, not the personal attributes of the particular 
contracting lawyer. 
Besides protecting the client from probable harm, a per se rule 
would have other beneficial effects. Congestion of the courts would 
be eased somewhat by the abolition of the need for judicial review of 
these contracts at the pre-trial stage, and by a reduction in the 
number of habeus corpus petitions alleging a conflict of interest. 
Also, the rule would destroy a potential device for "built-in rever­
sal." Although the Maxwell majority noted that a defendant who 
waived all disclosed conflicts of interest would be unable to assert 
158. See United States v. Hun, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (if attorney's pecuni­
ary interests are solely speculative, we should presume the lawyer will subordinate his 
interests). 
159. 30 Cal. 3d at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J., 
dissenting). 
160. Id at 636, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 195 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
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those con1licts on appeal,161 Justice Kaus, in his concurrence, dis­
agreed and stated he had no doubt but that the defendant would 
raise those very con1licts on appeal. 162 




A. California Rules ofProfessional Conduct 
Because the California State Bar chose to draft its own code of 
ethics rather than to simply adopt the ABA Model Code of Profes­
sional Responsibility, Maxwell's lawyers were bound only by the 
California Rules of Professional Conduct. In determining whether 
the life story agreement involved in Maxwell violated that code, the 
relevant rule to interpret is Rule 5-10 I which provides: 
A member of the State Bar shall not enter into a business transac­
tion with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, 
security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless 
(I) the transaction and terms in which the member of the State 
Bar acquires the interest are lair and reasonable to the client and 
are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in man­
ner and terms which should have reasonably been understood by 
the client, (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek 
the advice of independent counsel of the client's choice on the 
. transaction, and (3) the client consents in writing thereto. 163 
This rule is quite liberal and the Maxwell majority found no viola­
tion. The dissent, however, argued that the terms of the contract 
violated the "fair and reasonable" requirement. l64 But if the terms 
of a life story agreement are truly fair to the client, and disclosure of, 
and consent to conflicts are in writing, then presumably the creation 
of such a contract by a California attorney is not an unethical or 
prohibited practice. 
B. ABA Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility 
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA 
Code)16S has taken quite a different approach to life story fee agree­
161. Id at 619 n.lI, 639 P.2d at 265 n.lI, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185 n.lI. 
162. Id at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Kaus, J., concurring). 
163. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-101 (1975) (empha­
sis added). 
164. 30 Cal. 3d at 630-31, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., 
dissenting) (compelled waiver of attomey-client privilege is both unfair and 
unreasonable). 
165. Since Maxwell, the ABA has officially adopted the Model Rules of Profes­
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ments. Aside from general cautions to avoid adverse interests (simi­
lar to California's Rule 5-101),166 the ABA Code spec!ftcally 
proscribes life story fee agreements in Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B), 
which states: 
Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his 
employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or un­
derstanding with a client or a prospective client by which he ac­
quires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject 
matter of his employment or proposed employment.167 
Clearly, Maxwell's contract would be a prohibited transaction 
under this Disciplinary Rule (DR). Its mere creation would be a per 
se ethical violation because the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Code 
are mandatory in character. 168 Deviations from "shall not" proscrip­
tions constitute misconduct. 169 Ethical Considerations (EC), how­
ever, are merely aspirational in character and were designed to 
provide guidelines to a lawyer. 170 They are also helpful in under­
standing the rationale behind some of the Disciplinary Rules. For 
example, EC 5-4 articulates the justification for the per se prohibi­
tion of DR 5-104(B): 
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is per­
mitted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publica­
tion rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he 
may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his 
own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a crim­
inal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion pic­
ture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with 
respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or uncon­
sciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his 
publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these 
potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be scru­
pulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the mat­
ter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment 
has previously ended}7l 
sional Conduct as proposed by the Kulak Commission. The proscription against these 
agreements was retained. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text. 
166. See, e.g .• MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A). ­
IOI(A). -105(A) (1981). 
167. Id DR 5-104(A). 
168. Id preamble and preliminary statement. 
169. "A lawyer shall not: Violate a Disciplinary Rule." Id DR 1-102(A)(I). 
170. Id preamble and preliminary statement. 
171. Id EC 5-4; see also id EC 5-2. 
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A life story agreement such as Maxwell's, in which the client 
waives the attorney-client privilege, would give the lawyer the right 
to reveal his client's secrets and confidences.172 Although the ABA 
Code allows an attorney to reveal secrets and confidences with the 
consent of his client after full disclosure,173 EC 4-1 suggests a loftier 
standard of conduct: "Both the fiduciary relationship existing be­
tween lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal sys­
tem require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets 
of one who has employed or sought to employ him."174 Addition­
ally, EC 4-5 adds: "A lawyer should not use information acquired in 
the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the 
client. ..."17S These guidelines provide further justification for the 
ABA Code's condemnation of life story agreements. 
Further, these contracts violate the ABA Code's requirement 
that an attorney represent his client zealously.J76 DR 7-101(A)(3) 
states: "Representing a Client Zealously. (A) A lawyer shall not in­
tentionally: . . . (3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course 
of the professional relationship ...."177 Divided loyalties and di­
minished zeal are inevitable results of the contract's inherent 
con1licts. 
Because the integrity of the judicial process is directly impli­
cated by the creation of life story agreements, the Ethical Considera­
tions relating to Canon 9 of the ABA Code also provide support for 
DR 5-104(B)'s explicit prohibition. EC 9-1 states: "A lawyer should 
promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profes­
sion."17s According to EC 9-6, this responsibility means that an at­
torney owes a duty "to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the 
legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of 
his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only profes­
sional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety." 179 
C. ABA Proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct 
The drafters of the Model Rules chose to retain the prohibition 
172. For definitions of "secrets" and "confidences", see id DR 4-101(A). 
173. fd. DR 4-101(C)(I). 
174. fd. EC 4-1. 
175. fd. EC 4-5. 
176. "This obligation, in its fullest sense, is the heart of the adversary process." 
Thode, TIre Etlrical Standmd/or tire AdI'ocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 584 (1961). 
177. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(3) (1981); see 
also id. EC 7-1. 
178. fd. EC 9-1. 
179. fd. EC 9-6. 
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against life story fee agreements in what is now the "new" ABA 
Code. ISO An approach similar to that of the ABA Code was taken. 
The Model Rules first provide a general rule concerning conflicts of 
interest. lSI This rule allows continued representation if the lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected 
and the client consents. IS2 
The Model Rules continue, however, to set apart life story 
agreements as a distinct exception to the general rule. Rule 1.8, enti­
tled "Conftict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions," provides in sub­
section (d) that: "Prior to the conclusion of representation of a 
client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the 
lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in 
substantial part on information relating to the representation."ls3 
The comment made by the drafters relating to this "shall not" provi­
sion indicates their distaste for a practice which would be so poten­
tially harmful to a client: 
An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights 
concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict be­
tween the interests of the client and the personal interest of the 
lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may 
detract from the publication value of an account of the 
representation. 184 
It seems that the drafters' underlying concerns were with the element 
of temptation and the need to assure the independence of a lawyer's 
professional judgment. In a subsequent note to the rule, the drafters 
made it clear that "[t]his Rule deals with certain transactions that per 
se involve conftict of interest." ISS 
D. 	 ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal 
Justice: The Defense Function 
The Defense Function sets out minimum standards of conduct 
for defense attorneys. In addition to a general rule on conftict of 
interest, there is a separate provision which expressly refers to the 
issue at hand. Standard 4-3.4, entitled "Obtaining Publication 
Rights from the Accused," states that: 
180. The Model Rules, proposed by the Kutak Commission, were finally adopted 
by the ABA on August 2, 1983. 
181. 	 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). 
182. 	 Id 
183. 	 Id Rule 1.8(d). 
184. 	 Id Rule 1.8(d) comment. 
185. 	 Id Rule 1.8(d) note on code comparison. 
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It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer, prior to conclusion of all 
aspects of the matter giving rise to his or her employment, to enter 
into any agreement or understanding with a client or a prospective 
client by which the lawyer acquires an interest in publication 
rights with respect to the subject matter of the employment or pro­
posed employment. 186 
It is quite clear that the ABA, if not the State Bar of California, 
is genuinely concerned with the specific issue of an attorney's acqui­
sition of literary rights. In declaring it to be a per se contlict of inter­
est, and in treating this issue separately from other contlict of interest 
situations, the ABA has taken a strong and decisive stand. It is now 
up to the courts to give meaning to the ABA's action by enforcing at 
least this one per se ethical prohibition. It does little good to revise 
an outdated code of ethics if the new code will have no more of a 
regulatory effect than the old. The legal profession has taken it upon 
itself to regulate the conduct of its members. This is a laudable goal 
but an empty one if lawyers continue to ignore the rules, hoping to 
escape disciplinary action. The misconception of many is that the 
rules of the profession state only ethical guidelines, not legal stan­
dards. 187 The ABA Code was designed to be essentially regulatory 
and mandatory in effect, but this legal function has been obscured by 
the label "code of ethics."188 It has been promised that "the new 
rules will comprise collectively the 'law of legal ethics.' "189 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An attorney's pledge of undivided loyalty is immediately bro­
ken at the creation of an attorney-client contract giving the attorney 
exploitation rights to the client's life story. This pledge stems not 
only from the attorney's fiduciary duties but from the Constitution as 
well. l90 The Constitution's guarantee of effective assistance of coun­
186. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL Jus­
TICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-3.4 (1983). 
187. Patterson,A Preliminary Rationalization ofthe Low ofLegal Ethics, 57 N.C.L. 
REv. 519, 521-23 (1979); see Comment, TIre Lowyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DUKE L.J. 
1335, 1335. 
188. Comment, supra note 187, at 1357-58. 
189. Id at 1335 (quoting Patterson, supra note 187, at 555). Patterson advocates 
recognizing an attorney's duty of loyalty as a legal, rather than ethical, rule because, to 
do otherwise, is to "vest in private lawyers. . . a vast amount of untutored discretion." 
Patterson, supra note 187, at 554-55. 
190. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It has long been settled 
that such "assistance" must also be "effective." 
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sel must be read to require undivided loyalty and devotion to the 
client's interests. When the pledge of loyalty is broken by a conflict 
of interest that was deliberately manufactured and has only financial 
motives at its core, effective representation must be presumed an im­
possibility. Such an open-ended invitation of prejudice defies both 
ethical and constitutional standards. And if two constitutional rights 
must clash, surely the right to "effectiveness" must be deemed more 
crucial to ensuring fairness than the right to counsel of "choice." 
For these reasons, a per se rule of judicial invalidation of these 
contracts is a justifiable remedy. The stakes are simply too high to 
engage in speculation as to the amount of actual harm likely to re­
sult. The situation demands more than a middle-of-the road ap­
proach. The ABA has done its part in seeking to curb a fast­
growing, serious problem. It is now up to the courts to shoulder the 
remaining responsibility; if not to help maintain the integrity of the 
private bar, then to maintain the integrity of the judiciary. 
Laura L. Higgins 
